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THE PRIVATE PRISON
DILEMMA
by ADRIANA BALLINES
In September 2009, Tanya Guzman-Martinez, a transgender woman, wasplaced in removal proceedings and held for eight months at the Eloy Deten-
tion Center.1 Eloy Detention Center is a private prison operated by Correc-
tions Corporations of America (“CCA”), the largest private-prison corporation
in the United States.2
Despite her requests for protection, Guzman-Martinez was placed in the male
housing unit.3 There, she was subjected to verbal abuse and harassment, was
patted down by male officers, and was forced by a CCA officer to perform
sexual acts.4 Guzman-Martinez filed a lawsuit against CCA, but her case was
dismissed.5 She re-filed her case in August of 2012.6
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THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE PRISONS
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security spent a record-high, $2 bil-
lion, in tax dollars on detaining immigrants.7Approximately 34,000 immi-
grants are detained every night.8 Like Guzman-Martinez, about half of these
detained immigrants are held in privately run prisons.9
Since the opening of the first private prison in 1984, the industry has ex-
panded rapidly throughout both state and federal corrections.10 Supporters of
prison privatizations argue that the significant cost savings that private prisons
purport to offer - lower wage and benefit costs for labor, lower procurement
costs, and more efficient administration and operation – warrant their contin-
ued growth.11 However, a recent nationwide research study indicated that “av-
erage savings from prison privatization was only about 1 percent, rather than
the projected 20-percent savings.”12
Moreover, in the last decade, “the three largest corporations with stakes in
immigration detention,” CCA, the GEO Group, and Management and Train-
ing Co. together spent “at least $45 million. . .on campaign donations and
lobbyists at the state and federal level.”13
Several sources suggest a correlation between campaign contributions and lob-
bying, and an increase in profits and contracts with US Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (“ICE”).  For example, between 1999 and 2009, CCA
alone spent $18,002,000 on federal lobbying.14 “Of its 43 lobbying disclosures
[filed between 2008 and 2010]. . . only five do not expressly state [an] in-
tent. . . to. . . influence immigration reform policy. . .”15 In 2010, CCA re-
ported a gross revenue of $1.7 billion.16
The correlation “is definitely not coincidental” said Alexis Perlmutter, acting
director of policy for the National Immigrant Justice Center.17 “I think [pri-
vate prison corporations] lobby to make more money, and they have been very
good at it up to this point.”18 The result is an “incarceration rate that is not
justified legally with the realities of immigrant detainees,” said the Assistant
Director at UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic, Holly S. Cooper.19
This is problematic because, as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
Human Rights of Migrant, Franc¸ois Cre´peau, explains, “the level of accounta-
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bility and the level of transparency that are required for proper supervision of
detention facilities are usually not present in the case of privately-run corpora-
tions. When you have a private corporation with its profit-generating bottom
line, you have a significant interference with public policy outcomes,” said
Cre´peau .20 For instance, in 2011 CCA “lobbied heavily against a bill that
would force them to comply with the same open records requirements gov-
erning public facilities.”21
DETENTION CONDITIONS
In a report published in May, 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) of Georgia interviewed 68 immigrant detainees and visited four dif-
ferent immigrant detention facilities under investigation.22  Three of the four
facilities visited, including Stewart, North Georgia Detention Center
(NGDC), and Irwin, were privately run prisons. Stewart and NGDC are both
managed by CCA, while Irwin is operated by Detention Management, LLC.23
Stewart had the highest deportation rate in the country – at 98.8%.24 Yet, only
two out of the 28 detainees interviewed at Stewart had legal representation.25
“[B]ecause the majority of immigrant detainees are housed in facilities in rural
locations far away from their homes,” legal representation for them is scarce
and cost-prohibitive.26
In response to the report, Steve Owen, CCA spokesman and operator of Stew-
art and the NGDC, said that “ACLU ignored or underplayed CCA responses
to some of the criticisms of its facilities.”27 “Some of the allegations were un-
substantiated or incorrect,” argued Owen.28
“I wouldn’t say that detainees are more at risk of human rights abuses” in
private prisons, said Perlmutter.29 In fact, those prisons “could be doing things
better” but it is difficult to know because it is “very challenging to find out
information from them without suing.”30
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION
While detaining an individual costs the US government about $166 per day,
more humane and efficient alternatives to detention (“ATD”) cost only about
$8.88 per day.31 Yet, the Obama administration requested only $111.59 mil-
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lion for ATD for fiscal year 2013.32 This amount is much lower than the
$2.026 billion that the U.S. House of Representatives appropriated for the
detention of immigrants.33
“We encounter people all the time who do not need to be detained,” said
Perlmutter.34 Perlmutter explains that “Congress determines the immigration
detention bed space every year, the problem is that DHS interprets this num-
ber as a mandatory requirement that they have to hold in custody.”35
In fact, when the Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, Cecilia Mun˜oz, was
asked whether it was true that ICE agents who do not meet the goal of deport-
ing 400,000 individuals every year pay a very high price in Washington,” she
responded, “Congress passes the laws, appropriates the funds for implementing
the laws, and the federal agency’s job is to do what Congress has told them to
do.  That is how a democracy works.”36
“There are two elements that affect the lack of use of ATD,” explained Cre´-
peau. One is that “ATD are not sufficiently developed.”37 The other element is
“the fact that irregular migrants are not a political constituency. [Thus], politi-
cians are not incentivized to protect them, and this is a structural failure of our
democracies.”38 Because the courts are not subject to the same electoral pres-
sure, “access to the justice system for migrants is extremely important.”39
The case of Guzman-Martinez exemplifies many of the difficulties that indi-
viduals and attorneys face when seeking legal remedies against private-prisons
corporations. As Cooper explained, “the weakness of private prisons is the lack
of transparency and the fact that they are using their resources to advocate for
increased incarceration rates.”40
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